Working memory, or the ability to hold and manipulate information in the mind, is a critical component of human intelligence and executive functioning. It is correlated with performance on various cognitive tasks, including measures of fluid intelligence, which encompasses reasoning and problem solving. We use a comprehensive set of classic working memory tasks to estimate the working memory capacity of large language models (LLMs). We find that in most cases, LLMs exceed normative human scores. However, we do not find that the increased capacity of working memory is associated with higher performance on other executive functioning tasks or problem solving benchmarks. These results suggest that LLMs may have deficits in attentional control and cognitive flexibility, which result in difficulties with inhibiting automatic responses and adapting to shifting information. Our findings suggest that current reasoning models have mixed results in compensating for these deficits.

We show how an "Elman" network architecture, constructed from recurrently connected oscillatory associative memory network mod(cid:173) ules, can employ selective "attentional" control of synchronization to direct the flow of communication and computation within the architecture to solve a grammatical inference problem. Previously we have shown how the discrete time "Elman" network algorithm can be implemented in a network completely described by continuous ordinary differential equations. The time steps (ma(cid:173) chine cycles) of the system are implemented by rhythmic variation (clocking) of a bifurcation parameter. In this architecture, oscilla(cid:173) tion amplitude codes the information content or activity of a mod(cid:173) ule (unit), whereas phase and frequency are used to "softwire" the network. Only synchronized modules communicate by exchang(cid:173) ing amplitude information; the activity of non-resonating modules contributes incoherent crosstalk noise.

We present a connectionist method for representing images that ex(cid:173) plicitly addresses their hierarchical nature. It blends data from neu(cid:173) roscience about whole-object viewpoint sensitive cells in inferotem(cid:173) poral cortex8 and attentional basis-field modulation in V43 with ideas about hierarchical descriptions based on microfeatures.5,11 The resulting model makes critical use of bottom-up and top-down pathways for analysis and synthesis.6 We illustrate the model with a simple example of representing information about faces. Images of objects constitute an important paradigm case of a representational hi(cid:173) erarchy, in which'wholes', such as faces, consist of'parts', such as eyes, noses and mouths.

People perform a remarkable range of tasks that require search of the visual en- vironment for a target item among distractors. The Guided Search model (Wolfe, 1994, 2007), or GS, is perhaps the best developed psychological account of hu- man visual search. To prioritize search, GS assigns saliency to locations in the visual field. Saliency is a linear combination of activations from retinotopic maps representing primitive visual features. GS includes heuristics for setting the gain coefficient associated with each map.

The study of attentional processing in vision has a long and deep history. Recently, several papers have presented insightful perspectives into how the coordination of multiple attentional functions in the brain might occur. These begin with experimental observations and the authors propose structures, processes, and computations that might explain those observations. Here, we consider a perspective that past works have not, as a complementary approach to the experimentally-grounded ones. We approach the same problem as past authors but from the other end of the computational spectrum, from the problem nature, as Marr's Computational Level would prescribe. What problem must the brain solve when orchestrating attentional processes in order to successfully complete one of the myriad possible visuospatial tasks at which we as humans excel? The hope, of course, is for the approaches to eventually meet and thus form a complete theory, but this is likely not soon. We make the first steps towards this by addressing the necessity of attentional control, examining the breadth and computational difficulty of the visuospatial and attentional tasks seen in human behavior, and suggesting a sketch of how attentional control might arise in the brain. The key conclusions of this paper are that an executive controller is necessary for human attentional function in vision, and that there is a 'first principles' computational approach to its understanding that is complementary to the previous approaches that focus on modelling or learning from experimental observations directly.

People perform a remarkable range of tasks that require search of the visual environment for a target item among distractors. The Guided Search model (Wolfe, 1994, 2007), or GS, is perhaps the best developed psychological account of human visual search. To prioritize search, GS assigns saliency to locations in the visual field. Saliency is a linear combination of activations from retinotopic maps representing primitive visual features. GS includes heuristics for setting the gain coefficient associated with each map.

People perform a remarkable range of tasks that require search of the visual environment for a target item among distractors. The Guided Search model (Wolfe, 1994, 2007), or GS, is perhaps the best developed psychological account of human visual search. To prioritize search, GS assigns saliency to locations in the visual field. Saliency is a linear combination of activations from retinotopic maps representing primitive visual features. GS includes heuristics for setting the gain coefficient associated with each map.

People perform a remarkable range of tasks that require search of the visual environment fora target item among distractors. The Guided Search model (Wolfe, 1994, 2007), or GS, is perhaps the best developed psychological account of human visualsearch. To prioritize search, GS assigns saliency to locations in the visual field. Saliency is a linear combination of activations from retinotopic maps representing primitive visual features. GS includes heuristics for setting the gain coefficient associated with each map.

Theories of visual attention commonly posit that early parallel processes extract conspicuous features such as color contrast and motion from the visual field. These features are then combined into a saliency map, and attention is directed to the most salient regions first. Top-down attentional control is achieved by modulating the contribution of different feature types to the saliency map. A key source of data concerning attentional control comes from behavioral studies in which the effect of recent experience is examined as individuals repeatedly perform a perceptual discrimination task (e.g., "what shape is the odd-colored object?"). The robust finding is that repetition of features of recent trials (e.g., target color) facilitates performance. We view this facilitation as an adaptation to the statistical structure of the environment. We propose a probabilistic model of the environment that is updated after each trial. Under the assumption that attentional control operates so as to make performance more efficient for more likely environmental states, we obtain parsimonious explanations for data from four different experiments. Further, our model provides a rational explanation for why the influence of past experience on attentional control is short lived.

Theories of visual attention commonly posit that early parallel processes extract conspicuous features such as color contrast and motion from the visual field. These features are then combined into a saliency map, and attention is directed to the most salient regions first. Top-down attentional control is achieved by modulating the contribution of different feature types to the saliency map. A key source of data concerning attentional control comes from behavioral studies in which the effect of recent experience is examined as individuals repeatedly perform a perceptual discrimination task (e.g., "what shape is the odd-colored object?"). The robust finding is that repetition of features of recent trials (e.g., target color) facilitates performance. We view this facilitation as an adaptation to the statistical structure of the environment. We propose a probabilistic model of the environment that is updated after each trial. Under the assumption that attentional control operates so as to make performance more efficient for more likely environmental states, we obtain parsimonious explanations for data from four different experiments. Further, our model provides a rational explanation for why the influence of past experience on attentional control is short lived.